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EXTERNAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING1 
COLIN DEY, University of Stirling, &  
JANE GIBBON, Newcastle University 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Rising levels of voluntary, unregulated corporate social, environmental and 
sustainability reporting (SER hereafter) have failed to satisfy a wide range of critics, 
who have argued that they exhibit a number of major shortcomings, including, inter 
alia: incompleteness (Belal, 2002; Adams, 2004; Bouten et al., 2011), unreliability 
(Swift and Dando, 2002; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005); silencing and/or manipulation 
of the views of stakeholders (Owen et al., 2001; Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Archel 
et al., 2011); falsely legitimating businesses’ belief in the sustainability of their 
operations (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Campbell, 2000); promoting a ‘business as 
usual’ agenda (Larrinaga-Gonzalez and Bebbington, 2001); conveying weak versions 
of sustainable development (Bebbington and Thomson, 1996); and managerial 
capture of the social and environmental agenda (Owen et al., 2000; O’Dwyer, 2003; 
Baker, 2010).  
 
One practical remedy, or antidote, to the problems inherent in contemporary 
organisation-centred SER is to consider the development and practice of alternative 
forms of social accounting, which may emanate from sources outside the accounting 
entity. At a basic level, the value of such forms of social accounting lies in their 
potential to increase the amount of publicly-available information about a particular 
issue or entity. In addition, however, such accounts may also enable the inclusion of a 
                                                 
1 This chapter updates and significantly widens the scope of Dey’s original chapter on Developing 
Silent and Shadow Accounts from 2007. In doing so, it draws on material which also appears in Dey et 
al. (2010, 2012). 
wider range of (previously silenced or manipulated) stakeholder voices, and may 
embody different conceptions of silenced, contested and/or captured terms such as 
‘nature’, ‘society’ and ‘business success’. In doing so, they may become aligned with 
progressive social agendas, including not only reformist efforts to augment corporate 
accountability, but also activist attempts to de-legitimate the actions of dominant 
institutions, or mobilise opinion in favour of more radical transformative change. In 
this chapter, we will explore such alternative techniques, which we refer to here as 
external social accounting.   
 
Given the emphasis above on the potential benefits of such an approach, in contrast to 
the widespread, if problematic adoption of contemporary SER, readers may be 
forgiven for assuming that such an alternative conception of social accounting is 
relatively new or at least avant-garde in some way. However, it is important to 
emphasise that external social accounting has a long history which actually predates 
the emergence of modern SER practice (Gray et al., 1993, 1996; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003). Its development has been supported and sustained by other more 
familiar and long-standing cultural traditions, including investigative journalism 
(Pilger, 2004), as well as the grass-roots activism of various social movements and 
campaigning pressure groups (Lubbers, 2003). In recent years, such traditions have 
also been supported by the growth of the internet as a communication medium 
(Gallhofer et al., 2006).  
 
At the same time however, episodes of experimentation with external social accounts 
have been somewhat intermittent and fragmented. They have also, rather confusingly, 
been referred to by a number of different terms, including: social audits (Medawar, 
1976), anti-reports (Ridgers, 1979), plant closure audits (Harte and Owen, 1987; 
Geddes, 1992), silent accounts (Gray, 1997), shadow accounts (Gibson et al., 2001; 
Dey, 2007), reporting-performance portrayal gaps (Adams, 2004), social accounts 
(Cooper et al., 2005), and counter accounts (Gallhofer et al., 2006). In this chapter, we 
explore the variety of guises in which external social accounts have appeared, and 
highlight their typical dimensions or characteristics. In particular, we draw attention 
to a broad source of differentiation between extant forms of external social 
accounting: accounts that seek to discharge a comprehensive, systematic 
accountability; and accounts that offer a more radical, partisan reporting, often of 
oppressed, silenced voices.  
 
That a range of alternative approaches may be identified is perhaps unsurprising, 
given that external social accountants, particularly NGOs involved in activism and 
advocacy, are already known to use a number of different strategies to engage with 
corporations (Bliss, 2002; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009). However, such 
differences also point to a deeper tension at the heart of the relationship involving 
external social accountants and their target accounting ‘entity’, between collaboration 
and reform on the one hand, and confrontation and resistance on the other. Before 
exploring such issues further, however, it is perhaps best to start by outlining what 
these seemingly different experiments in new forms of accounting have in common.  
 
In general terms, external social accounts are a form of social accounting produced by 
external individuals and/or organisations, including campaigning NGOs, on their 
representation of the social and environmental impacts of others. The intended 
audience for such external reports is not simply the accounting entity associated with 
the problematic impacts, but may also include political institutions, civil society, the 
media, and sections of the general public. On a more conceptual level, external social 
accounting may be defined as a form of accounting that seeks to make ‘thinkable’ and 
‘governable’ those issues currently regarded by dominant organisations and 
institutions as ‘unthinkable’ and ‘ungovernable’ (Dey et al., 2010). It may be viewed 
as a technology that measures, creates, makes visible, represents and communicates 
evidence in contested arenas characterised by multiple, often contradictory reports, 
prepared according to different institutional and ideological rules (Georgakopoulos & 
Thomson, 2008). By systematically creating alterative representations, new visibilities 
and knowledge of existing situations, external social accounts seek to problematise 
behaviour and act as a catalyst for change. Hence, any evaluation of external social 
accounting should explore how such accounts may be used as discursive 
‘ammunition’ to contest, reform, and/or resist prevailing institutional behaviour. In 
the next section of the chapter, we begin to trace the history of external social 
accounting and discuss the main objectives and characteristics of the reports produced 
during that time. 
 
EARLY EXPERIMENTS IN EXTERNAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING 
The work of Social Audit Ltd and Counter Information Services (CIS) during the 
1970s and 80s are the most celebrated antecedents of modern SER (and counter-SER) 
practice (Medawar, 1976; Ridgers, 1979; Geddes, 1992; Gray et al., 1993, 1996; 
Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). Ironically, alhough the eponymous company title 
effectively makes the term ‘social audit’ a proprietary one, this is rather misleading: 
social account would have been a more accurate name. In essence, both organisations 
were established to publish ‘counter-information’ as a response to the (then) 
perceived absence of, and demand for, accountability disclosures.  
 
During the 1970s Social Audit Ltd produced five detailed and lengthy external social 
accounts of the behaviour of specific target organisations. The content of these ‘social 
audits’ reflected a strong overriding intention to obtain comprehensive and reliable 
information about the target organisation’s interactions with key stakeholder groups, 
including employees, consumers, community and the environment. Detailed 
discussion of these accounts is beyond the scope of this chapter (but see, especially, 
Gray et al., 1996). However, it is worth noting that the accounts were prepared 
according to a set of explicit objectives in order to better discharge the target 
organisation’s accountability (Gray et al., 1996). For example, in its social account of 
Avon Rubber Ltd2, these objectives were defined as follows: 
“The report has been prepared to: (i) show to what extent it may be possible to 
assess what, in social terms, a company gives to and takes from the 
community in which it operates; (ii) advance understanding about the practical 
problems and possibilities that may be involved in making assessments of this 
kind; and (iii) establish precedents for the disclosure of more, hard 
information about what companies do, why they do it, and to what general 
effect” (Social Audit Ltd, 1976, p.2). 
 
A further characteristic of the approach taken by Social Audit Ltd was to explicitly 
seek to produce such reports with the full co-operation of the ‘target’ organisation. 
However, of the five reports Social Audit Ltd produced, only Avon Rubber Ltd 
agreed to co-operate in this way, before withdrawing its co-operation after the draft 
                                                 
2 A copy of the Avon Rubber Ltd report can be found online via the Centre for Social & Environmental 
Accounting Research at: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/csear/sa-exemplars/external-social-audits/.  
report was completed. While the reports produced by Social Audit Ltd did achieve 
some wider visibility, they were both lengthy and difficult to verify (Gray et al., 
1996). As a consequence, “the inevitable result was that [they] were ignored in the 
main by company management, particularly where the message conveyed was a 
largely unpalatable one. Furthermore, [attempts] to mobilise shareholder opinion… 
met with scant response, even from supposedly socially concerned groups” (p. 272). 
 
By contrast, the work of Counter Information Services (see, for example, CIS, 1971) 
was a deliberately less systematic, and rather more partisan, approach to external 
social accounting. CIS was a “Marxist collective of journalists dedicated to seeking 
radical changes in society” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 273), which published a series of so-
called ‘Anti-Reports’ between 1971 and 1984, focusing on specific high-profile 
corporations involved in controversial activities3. A feature of the reports was the use 
of employee ‘voices’, in direct juxtaposition with corporate rhetoric, as an attempt to 
create a powerful dissonance in the mind of the reader (Adams and Whelan, 2009). 
This technique was used regularly by CIS to highlight controversial issues such as the 
alienating and repressive reality of poor working conditions (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003). As Gray et al. observe, 
“The power of the reports lies in the use of photographs, frequent quotations, 
and vivid, emotive phraseology… The Anti-Reports clearly have little 
relevance to (social accounting) as a form of ‘objective’, ‘balanced’ and 
‘unbiased’ communication. They are, however, important as a particular and 
somewhat rare example of a ‘radical’ approach to reporting produced on a 
regular basis.” (1996, p. 274) 
                                                 
3 Further information on the origins of, and reports produced by CIS can be found online at: http://anti-
report.com. 
 While the output of Social Audit Ltd and CIS had declined by the mid-1980s4, the 
impact of a period of de-industrialisation within the UK economy at that time gave 
rise to a new phase of experimentation with external social accounting, in the form of 
‘plant closure audits’, carried out by a number of local authorities (Geddes, 1992). 
Harte and Owen (1987) discuss local authorities’ use of social cost analysis to 
measure the impact of plant closure decisions and problematise de-industrialisation, 
primarily in order to justify intervention to reverse the decisions, but also to change 
wider government industrial policy. In contrast to the emotive, partisan style of the 
CIS Anti-Reports, plant closure audits adopted a more quantitative (though arguably 
still subjective) methodology, to estimate the ‘true’ cost to the local economy and 
community of higher unemployment. A further notable aspect of these audits was 
their implicit appeal to a framework of accountability, or ‘social contract’ between 
business, local government and the community (Gray et al., 1996, p. 277). However, 
echoing the eventual fate of the accountability-driven reports of Social Audit Ltd, the 
ultimate impact of plant closure audits was minimal, in that they failed to reverse any 
closure decisions. 
 
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EXTERNAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING AS A 
REACTION TO CORPORATE ‘GREENWASH’ 
During the late 1980s the popular phrase ‘greenwash’5 (Greer and Bruno, 1996; 
                                                 
4 It should be noted, however, that (at time of writing) elements of both organisations have survived 
and continue to operate. Social Audit Ltd remains a part of PIRC Ltd (Public Interest Research Centre, 
see http://www.pirc.info), while the work of CIS has recently resurfaced on the internet (see http://anti-
report.com) and appears to be linked to more recent activist projects (see 
http://www.whorunsthisplace.co.uk). 
5 ‘Greenwash’ is a portmanteau of the words ‘green’ and ‘whitewash’. It first entered the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary in 1999, and is defined as “disinformation disseminated by an organisation so as to 
present an environmentally responsible public image”. Since then, ‘greenwashing’ has been the subject 
Rowell, 2003) reflected growing social and media awareness of possible corporate 
manipulation of environmental issues (mass awareness of which was becoming 
invigorated by headlines about concerns over global warming and the use of CFCs). 
By the early 1990s, this had turned into a backlash against the early pioneers of 
ethical consumerism; Body Shop’s claims of social and environmental responsibility 
were especially subject to public and media scrutiny, and even an external ‘social 
audit’ (Entine, 2003). In the accounting literature, some research was undertaken to 
review the impact of pressure groups on published SER (Tilt, 1994), while calls were 
also made for improved independent ‘monitoring’ of the activities of multinational 
corporations (Bailey et al., 1994), which potentially involved some form of regulated 
external accountability reporting (Bailey et al., 2000).  
 
By the mid-1990s however, contemporary organisation-centred SER practice were 
beginning to emerge. As this grew into a rapidly rising groundswell of corporate, 
governmental and media enthusiasm for voluntary social and environmental 
reporting, the use of counter-information techniques waned. Although the quantity of 
emerging SER practice was relatively low, a sense of optimism drove forward 
attempts to improve ‘best practice’. In academia and beyond, efforts were 
increasingly directed pragmatically at trying to encourage corporations and assist in 
the development of the theory and practice of modern SER (see, for example, Zadek 
et al., 1997).  
 
In an effort to boost the relatively low volume of disclosure at that time, whilst at the 
same time prompt more critical reflection on the state of SER, Gray (1997) mooted 
                                                                                                                                           
of a number of ‘awards’ given to high-profile corporations by various campaigning NGOs (see, for 
example, http://www.corpwatch.org/section.php?id=102). 
the idea of reviving the concept of external social reporting by producing a corporate 
‘silent account’. Even in circumstances where no organisation-centred social account 
yet existed, a ‘silent account’ could still be compiled from ‘nuggets’ of relevant 
information obtained via all other formal corporate disclosure channels, including 
company annual reports, press releases, marketing campaigns, etc. These silent 
accounts were claimed to represent the corporation’s own voice, and were referred to 
as ‘silent’ because such information, although published, was not officially labelled or 
recognised as SER. To illustrate the concept, Gray produced a silent account based on 
the 1994 annual report of the pharmaceutical company Glaxo plc. The premise of this 
account was to identify relevant information from Glaxo’s annual report and to 
effectively ‘create’ a new piece of SER by collating this relevant information in a new 
document. Silent accounts could be seen as a simple way of generating more 
disclosure, as well as being ‘greater than the sum of their parts’, by (re)creating a 
picture of organisational accountability.  
 
By the late 1990s, concerns about the pervasive absence of corporate SER began to 
diminish, only to be replaced by concerns over the quality of emerging corporate 
disclosures. To find new ground upon which a critical evaluation of SER might be 
developed, a number of accounting academics started various separate research 
projects which sought to further explore forms of external social reporting6. Gray’s 
initial experimentation with silent accounting was developed to incorporate a form of 
external social accounting, which was termed ‘shadow accounting’. This concept was 
firmly rooted in the external social reports of the 1970s and 80s; indeed, the term 
‘shadow report’ itself appears to originate from that period (Gray et al., 1996, p. 274). 
                                                 
6 See also the ‘critical financial analysis’ developed and applied to the privatised utilities in the UK by 
Shaoul (1998). 
The shadow account represented a shift from an organisation-centred perspective 
towards more independent and stakeholder driven approaches (Gray et al., 1997). 
They were intended to reveal contradictions between what companies choose to report 
and what they suppress, problematising their activities and providing new insights 
into their social and environmental impacts: 
“first, [they] act as a ‘balancing view’ in the face of the considerable resources 
that organisations have at their disposal to put their own point of view and to 
offer their own emphasis on their activities. Secondly, [they] can be motivated 
by the realisation that if organisations will not discharge their own duty of 
accountability then it is possible for other bodies to do it on their behalf.” 
(Gibson et al., 2001) 
  
In seeking to illuminate the shortcomings of corporate accountability disclosures, the 
notion of shadow accounts recognised the increasing quantities of, and access to, 
counter-information in the public domain. A shadow account could consist of all 
relevant accountability information that was readily available in the public domain, 
produced independently of the subject organisation, and published externally from it. 
Such information could be relatively easily gathered by academic researchers and 
published, not simply as a separate document, but in direct juxtaposition to 
‘unofficial’ silent accounts (or, if they were available, ‘official’ SER), using the same 
categories and subject headings.  
 
To this end, Gibson et al. (2001) produced a series of combined reports on the 
activities of well-known UK companies, from different industry sectors, which had 
yet to produce their own dedicated social or environmental reports7. Together, the 
silent and shadow accounts presented the reader with a picture of corporate 
accountability that directly juxtaposed corporate and non-corporate sources of 
information. Though superficially reminiscent of the approach taken in the CIS 
reports of the 1970s and 80s, the Gibson et al. accounts instead sought to present 
information to the reader without partisan bias. A second, and perhaps less justifiable, 
characteristic of these reports was their relatively uncritical use of shadow 
information sources, which in the Gibson et al. accounts relied mainly on (potentially 
inaccurate) broadsheet newspaper articles. Nevertheless, despite its possible 
shortcomings, putting combined silent and shadow reports together in this way served 
as a compelling basis for revealing significant gaps in the completeness of corporate 
(non)disclosure.  
 
Whilst the experiments in silent and shadow accounting were being conducted, a 
separate project on external social reporting was undertaken by Adams (2004) to 
explore what she termed the ‘reporting-performance portrayal gap’. Adams’ case 
study, in contrast to the ‘silent’ study of a ‘non-reporting’ corporation by Gray (1997), 
examined a corporation (known only by the pseudonym ‘Alpha’) that had already 
been producing SER for some years. Using the accountability framework set out in 
the (now well established) social and environmental reporting guidelines of AA1000, 
Adams analysed Alpha’s published SER (for the years 1993 and 1999) by contrasting 
it against what the author was able to research and uncover about the chosen company 
from a wide range of (carefully verified) ‘shadow’ external information sources for 
the same time periods. In a broadly similar fashion to the experiments of Gibson et al. 
                                                 
7 Copies of the Gibson et al. shadow accounts can be obtained via the Centre for Social & 
Environmental Accounting Research at: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/csear/sa-exemplars/silent-and-
shadow/. 
(2001), Adams uses (and identifies in some detail) a wide range of sources of 
‘shadow’ information to illuminate the shortcomings of completeness present in SER 
disclosures. Like the Gibson et al. research, these shortcomings included situations 
where (a) shadow information was found to conflict in some way with the comparable 
corporate account, or (b) where shadow information cast light on something material 
to stakeholders which was not included in the SER report.  
 
In contrast to the work of Gray and Adams, other academic experiments with external 
social accounts produced since then may be viewed more as explicit forms of 
resistance against specific ways of governing, or seeking more radical transformation 
of prevailing governance. A further important feature of these later experiments is that 
the accounting ‘entity’ is not necessarily a corporation. Cooper et al. (2005) 
demonstrated the power of evidence-based external accounting in problematising 
student poverty and higher education financing plans in Scotland. Their intervention 
was also as tactical as it was evidential: it occurred during the consultation process 
before the change was enacted, suggesting that the timing of the publishing of 
external accounting is also important. In addition, those creating the external account 
used existing parliamentary processes to present their evidence on the negative 
consequences of a proposed reform, on what they defined as an oppressed social 
group.  
 
Two further recent studies of external social accounting also illustrate the way in 
which different forms of non-corporate accounting ‘entities’ may be used. Solomon 
and Thomson (2009) explained how a Victorian external account sought to 
problematize the complex issues of industrial and municipal river pollution as part of 
a wider campaign to improve river management, while Collison et al. (2007, 2010) 
sought to question the utopian beliefs and rationality of ‘Anglo-American’ 
shareholder capitalism. The objective of the study was to challenge such beliefs by 
presenting evidence of measurable negative social outcomes of Western governments 
that pursued neo-liberal economic policies. Rather than seeking to frame the study 
using the corporation as the ‘accounting entity’, Collison et al. (2007) used the nation 
state as a basis for evidence-based statistical comparisons of infant mortality and 
income inequality between wealthy countries. Their work may be viewed as an 
attempt to problematise in systemic terms the socio-economic policies, programmes 
and actions of governments of wealthy countries that champion neo-liberalism (see, 
especially, Wilkinson and Pickett, 20098). In doing so Collison et al. utilised highly 
respected and well-established datasets of social indicators, published by the United 
Nations. In this way, Collison et al. (2007) engaged with the process of governance by 
creating knowledge to open up new visibilities that challenged the calculative 
rationality that forms part of the discourse on the ‘superiority’ of Anglo-American 
shareholder capitalism. Implicit in this study was the repositioning of the relevant 
accounting entity of a nation from the (neo-liberal) entity of a collection of 
calculating, rational, responsible individuals to a society of liberal subjects, with 
common rights, obligations and interests.  
 
While academic reports of external accounting may offer interesting insights into the 
potential of such accounts, it is difficult to assess what impact, if any, they have had 
outside of the academic sphere. However, it may be possible to look elsewhere, since 
most of the impetus to engage directly with dominant institutions and structures of 
                                                 
8 In addition to this published output, further information on campaigning work and activism on this 
issue can be found at: http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk. 
concern has come from civil society and the activities of pressure groups and other 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) campaigning against the social and 
environmental impacts of corporate behaviour. 
 
COUNTER INFORMATION, NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
The work of Social Audit Ltd and CIS underlines the pioneering role played by civil 
society in experimenting with forms of external social reporting. While the previous 
section of this chapter focused on the work of academic social accountants to 
evidence gaps in existing SER, it should be recognised that such research is itself 
dependent on the increasing availability of wider sources of counter-information 
available in the public domain, much of it produced by civil society organisations. 
Despite efforts to legitimise the behaviour of corporations through the rapid 
expansion of contemporary SER practice in the 1990s, concerns over corporate abuse 
of power also became increasingly prominent during that time (Klein, 2000; Monbiot, 
2000; Hertz, 2001; Bakan, 2004). In recent years, popular and media interest in the 
issue has been sustained by a series of high profile cases in specific corporate settings, 
including: oil and gas production (Livesey, 2001; Holzer, 2007), fast-food (Schlosser, 
2002); supermarkets (Blythman, 2004; Simms, 2007); accounting (McLean and 
Elkind, 2004), and, most recently, banking (Sorkin, 2009). Such high-profile cases 
have further fuelled public discontent with the social and environmental impacts of 
modern capitalism. This has, in turn, has been visibly expressed through the 
networking, campaigns and activism of what may be termed ‘new social movements’. 
Such social movements include the activities of a wide range of campaigning pressure 
groups and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
 Social movements seek to raise global awareness of social and environmental issues 
and to hold organisations more accountable by mobilising grass-roots action against 
corporations and governments (Crossley, 2003). Large campaigning NGOs, including 
Greenpeace, Oxfam, War on Want, Amnesty, Christian Aid and Friends of the Earth 
(FoE) regularly produce reports on controversial aspects of corporate behaviour. In 
some cases, NGOs also form coalitions to lobby on specific high-profile campaign 
issues (see, for example, ECCJ, 2008). Globalisation, the emergence and spread of 
internet technology and the growth of organised, grass-roots social networks have all 
conspired to create the widespread public demand for counter-information about 
institutional accountability practices (Lubbers, 2003). Anti-corporate websites allow 
disgruntled individuals the chance to air their views to a global audience (Kahn and 
Kellner, 2005), while social media create the potential for such individuals to involve 
themselves and share information with diffuse networks of like-minded people. The 
websites of campaigning groups such as Corporate Watch and the Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre9 act as ‘portals’ to a range of counter information sources (see 
also Gallhofer et al., 2006; Spence, 2009).  
 
The focus within ‘new social movements’ on the perceived moral deficiencies of 
corporate behaviour, and associated ‘grievances’ against modern capitalism and 
globalization resonates strongly with the work of the critical accounting community 
(see, for example, Sikka and Willmott, 1997; Cooper et al., 2003; Everett, 2003; 
Spence, 2009). NGOs that have chosen to produce their own ‘shadow’ or ‘counter’ 
disclosures of specific corporate targets usually choose corporations that already 
                                                 
9 For more information, see http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk and http://www.business-
humanrights.org. 
provide high levels of voluntary SER. By arguably failing to close the ‘gap’ required 
to reassure or convince stakeholders, SER is interpreted and labelled by external 
stakeholder representatives as more ‘greenwash’, and thus may actually serve to 
mobilise action. One strategy that seems to be increasingly adopted by NGOs to 
tackle such corporate ‘propaganda’ is to publish their own counter-information in 
ways which directly confront existing organisation-centred SER10. 
 
An example of NGO-based external social accounting are the reports produced by 
FoE, including Failing the Challenge: The Other Shell Report (FoE, 2003a) and the 
Amec Counter Report (FoE, 2003b). The FoE document was ostensibly a 
retrospective review of Shell’s 2002 social report. However, examination of the 
content of the report reveals a series of short narrative ‘case-studies’ of various 
communities directly affected by Shell’s multi-national operations. Rather than using 
their report to simply state the difference between what Shell itself ‘says’ and what 
other stakeholders ‘know about’ Shell, FoE’s approach is strongly editorial, to (in the 
words of Shell’s own PR campaign of the time) ‘tell Shell’ what it thinks of Shell’s 
behaviour. Thus, in contrast to the work of Gray (1997) or Adams (2004), the FoE 
report does not attempt to evaluate Shell’s own SER in a systematic way. Whilst the 
FoE report emphasises the selective bias and unreliability of the Shell report, it does 
so with what is arguably an even more selective, and potentially unreliable, report. In 
some ways, the report echoes the output of organisations such as Counter Information 
Services described earlier in this chapter, that is intentionally provocative, generates 
media coverage, and creates a platform for the ‘voices’ of marginalised stakeholders 
                                                 
10 Copies of a range of examples of NGO external reporting, including those of FoE and ASH reviewed 
here, can be found via the Centre for Social & Environmental Accounting research at: : http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/csear/sa-exemplars/external-social-audits/. 
to be heard. However, in terms of their underlying intent, FoE’s reports appear rather 
less critical or emancipatory than the work of CIS (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). 
 
Whilst FoE’s work is broadly typical of what may be viewed as a modern revival of 
the more partisan approach to external social accounting pioneered by CIS, it is worth 
noting that not all examples of NGO-based reporting appear to exhibit such 
characteristics. At the same time as British American Tobacco (BAT) was publishing 
its first social report (BAT, 2002), the anti-smoking pressure group Action against 
Smoking and Health (ASH) produced British American Tobacco – the Other Report 
to Society (ASH, 2002a). In line with more recent SER, BAT claimed that their report 
was constructed using the best available voluntary reporting standards. The report 
included considerable efforts to engage directly with stakeholders through dialogue 
processes, and was also ‘verified’ by an external consultant. In response, the ASH 
document closely shadowed these processes and attempted to evidence in detail areas 
of disclosure where the BAT report fell short of the reporting standards it had claimed 
to adhere to. The ASH report criticised the scope of the social report, arguing that 
BAT had failed to identify its most important stakeholders. It also questioned the 
credibility and transparency of the report, concluding that BAT had failed to provide 
reliable information to stakeholders. ASH also criticised the management of the 
company’s ‘stakeholder dialogue’ process (a dialogue to which ASH, although invited 
to join, chose to ignore) on the grounds that there were “virtually no areas where BAT 
and ASH can find common cause – we characterise BAT’s relationship with public 
health as a zero-sum game” (ASH, 2002b; see also Moerman and Van Der Laan, 
2005). 
 
In summary, we may observe that, while modern NGO-based external social reporting 
may often be explicitly adversarial in the use of shadow information as ‘ammunition’ 
against its corporate target, this stance is taken at the expense of a relative weakness 
in the reports to systematically analyse completeness, assurance and dialogue gaps in 
SER. In the next section, we draw from our review of prior episodes of external social 
accounting to sketch out a broad typology of different forms of the technique and 
further discuss the potential implications of this classification for the study of external 
social accounting. 
 
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF EXTERNAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING 
Our review of prior experimentation with forms of external social accounting suggests 
that social accounting academics and NGOs share a common interest in illuminating 
the shortcomings of current SER, with a focus on evidencing (at least some) gaps in 
the completeness of published disclosures. At the same time, however, there are some 
interesting differences. Drawing in particular on the work of Dey et al. (2012), table 
7.1 below outlines a broad typology of different forms of external social accounting.  
 
 
 
Insert Table 7.1 here 
 
 
 
 
At its simplest, an external social account could be produced to challenge the 
acceptability of a specific aspect of the target organisation’s conduct or intention by 
providing new knowledge, such as evidence of the consequences of that conduct / 
intention. From this perspective, the extent of the transformation is limited in scope, 
but equally importantly, may offer the advantage of working co-operatively with 
existing power and resource structures. The work of Social Audit Ltd (1976), the 
plant closure audits of the 1980s (Geddes, 1992) as well as the silent accounts 
proposed by Gray (1997) and shadow accounts produced by Gibson et al. (2001), 
could be viewed (at least in terms of their stated intentions) as providing new 
information to enable existing forms of governing to operate more effectively. More 
recently, the reports produced by ASH (2002a,b) publicly challenged the 
completeness and accuracy standards of the target organisation’s social and 
environmental account by seeking to produce an alternative account informed by the 
same reporting standards.  
 
The second level of the typology characterises external social accounts as a method of 
reform to existing forms of governing, by demanding transformation of specific 
elements of the existing governing regime. At this level, the defined accounting entity 
may not necessarily be an individual organisation. These accounts, including the CIS 
anti-reports of the 1970s on specific companies, the academic experiments of Cooper 
et al. (2005) as well as the plant closure audits of the 1980s (Geddes, 1992) and the 
reports produced by campaigning NGOs such as FoE (2003a,b) seek to represent and 
problematise the unacceptable consequences of technologies of governing.  
 
A third, more explicitly resistance-based form of external social accounts, can be seen 
as part of attempts to fundamentally transform the existing governing regime. At this 
level, the focus is no longer on a specific organisation, and the type of transformation 
sought, whether around neo-liberal economics, public health inequalities, or climate 
change, is likely to be counter-hegemonic, and hence highly contested11. Ambiguities 
between the boundaries of our classification also become more evident here. While 
the targeting of specific corporations would seem to place them at the ‘partisan’ level 
of our classification, the overall body of work produced by CIS arguably embodies a 
broader counter-hegemonic radical agenda (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003) that justifies 
their classification as a more contra-governing form of external social accounting.  
 
 
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTS IN DISCURSIVE 
STRUGGLES BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND DOMINANT 
INSTITUTIONS 
The external social accounts reviewed in this chapter share a common objective of 
generating new information to challenge the conduct and/or intentions of the target 
accounting ‘entity’. As we have seen, however, many significant differences also 
exist. The fragmented, episodic nature of engagement with external social accounts is 
underlined by wide variations, not simply in the terminology adopted, but more 
importantly, in the scope, depth and type of evidence used. The work of Social Audit 
Ltd (1976) and the experiments of academics such as Gibson et al. (2001) and Adams 
(2004), whilst not entirely objective or verifiable, appear to offer a degree of balance 
and systematic coverage. They are arguably more grounded and rigorous by 
                                                 
11 A well-documented example of this kind of discursive struggle (in the context of the work of 
Wilkinson and Pickett) can be found at: http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/resources/other/response-to-
questions. 
comparison with the information activism of NGOs such as FoE (2003a, b) and CIS 
(1971).  External social accounts may be further differentiated by reference to the 
target accounting ‘entity’. This is not always a profit-oriented corporation, and may 
instead include sovereign nations, political campaigns, government proposals, public 
sector organisations, industrial sectors, regulators, geographic regions, social 
groupings and local communities.  
 
As table 7.1 shows, such differences may be explained by the extent of transformation 
that is sought by the external social accountant. Those who desire systematic and 
complete accounts of the behaviour of the target ‘entity’ appear to maintain faith in 
accounting as primarily a procedure for fully discharging that entity’s accountability, 
as well as in working co-operatively with that entity to deliver this objective. On the 
other hand, those who take a more partisan approach to external social accounting 
seem more interested in confrontation rather than cooperation. As the transformative 
agenda of the external social accountant becomes even more radical, their focus may 
also move beyond the corporate entity to the conduct or intentions of the governing 
regime itself.  
 
Rather than systematically generating new information in order to work within (or 
reform) existing accountability processes (Gray et al., 1996), the objective of more 
partisan external social accountants may be better understood as an attempt to 
mobilise public sentiment in ways that undermine the legitimacy of their target entity 
(Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Joutsenvirta, 2011). Following on from this, a 
number of questions arise. How effective is external social accounting as a discursive 
mechanism to engage with and challenge dominant institutions? Are external social 
accounts more effective when they subscribe to the types of standards of 
completeness and reliability used to measure the quality of (corporate) SER, or should 
they instead abandon such benchmarks and be restricted to the deliberately selective 
presentation of ‘counter information’?  
 
From a theoretical perspective, external social accounting has been argued to possess 
significant transformative, or even emancipatory potential (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Bebbington and Thomson, 2007; Spence, 2009). Such 
arguments have typically been deployed in favour of more partisan, counter-
hegemonic accounts. At the same time, the notion of a more systematic, complete 
account of corporate behaviour has been subjected to renewed criticism for its 
procedural emphasis (Shenkin and Coulson, 2007). Furthermore, the notions of 
transparency and accountability that underpin such procedural accounts may 
themselves be more problematic than previously thought (Roberts, 2009; Messner, 
2009). Concerns have also been expressed about the intentions and intervention 
strategies of external social accountants (Gray et al., 1996; Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003; Dey et al., 2010) and the academic social accounting community (Spence et al., 
2010). External social accounting is a voluntary activity, and external social 
accountants may be self-selecting individuals or undemocratic organisations which 
seek to bring about change in line with their own internal belief structure, which need 
not be emancipatory. This raises the question as to whether external social accounts 
can possess the necessary characteristics to be genuinely transformative or 
emancipatory, or whether external social accounting is merely a political device for 
imposing one worldview over others (see also Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). 
 
From a more practical perspective, it would appear that, despite providing compelling 
evidence, most external accounts (either systematic or partisan) have been ineffective 
in bringing about change (Gray et. al, 1996). Beyond this rather vague conclusion, 
however, the role of external social accounting as discursive ‘ammunition’ in 
legitimacy struggles between civil society and dominant institutions remains 
relatively poorly understood.  Researching external social accounting interventions 
requires a systemic investigation of the power relationships and dynamics, and 
broader assemblage of engagements and contextual factors, that constitute the 
governing network within which any reports are located (Georgakopoulos & 
Thomson, 2008).  
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed past episodes of experimentation with, and outlined 
a broad typology of, different approaches to external social accounting. We have also 
argued that to evaluate the role of external accounting interventions requires an 
explicit articulation not only of the intentions of the external accountants (Dey, 2007), 
but also their engagement strategies, tactics and outcomes (Dey et al., 2013). This is a 
particularly rich and worthwhile area of study, and recent research in the accounting 
literature (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009; Dey 
et al., 2013) and elsewhere (see, for example, Holzer, 2007; Hond and de Bakker, 
2007; Joutsenvirta, 2011) is now beginning to shed more light on the potential 
effectiveness of such interventions. 
. 
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